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I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 16, 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit handed down its decision in United States v. Hayes (the 
“Hayes Appeal”).1 In doing so, the Fourth Circuit became the lone 
circuit, splitting from nine others, in its interpretation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(9). 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), it is a crime for any individual with a 
misdemeanor conviction of domestic violence (“MCDV”) to possess, 
ship, or transport a firearm that has traveled in or affected interstate 
commerce. In the Hayes Appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the 
predicate offense of an MCDV must have as an element a domestic 
relationship.2 All nine other circuits to address this issue, however, have 
ruled to the contrary, holding that the MCDV need only have the element 
of force and that the relationship between the parties can be established 
using evidence beyond the elements of the underlying offense.3 It is this 
process of proving the existence of a predicate offense—permitted by at 
least nine circuits—that this Article will explore in detail. 
This Article will show that allowing predicate offenses to be proven 
using evidence outside the judicial record of a prior conviction has the 
potential to invoke a variety of constitutional concerns, including the 
Sixth Amendment’s right to a speedy trial, the Tenth Amendment’s 
protection of states’ rights, and, most significantly, the Fifth 
Amendment’s protection against double jeopardy. It is the goal of this 
Article to shed light on the most significant of these concerns. The 
Article establishes that proving the existence of a predicate offense with 
evidence outside the judicial record of a prior conviction, if permitted, 
must be subject to a double jeopardy analysis in order to protect a 
  
 1 United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 
3255 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2008) (No. 07-608) (holding that the text, structure, and legislative 
history of the law, and the rule of lenity, mandated that the statute be read to require that 
the MCDV have a domestic relationship as an element). 
 2 Id. at 759. 
 3 See United States v. Heckenliable, 446 F.3d 1048, 1049 (10th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003); White v. Dep’t of Justice, 328 
F.3d 1361, 1364–67 (Fed. Cir. 2003); United States v. Shelton, 325 F.3d 553, 562 (5th 
Cir. 2003); United States v. Barnes, 353 U.S. App. D.C. 87, 295 F.3d 1354, 1358–61 
(D.C. Cir. 2002); United States v. Kavoukian, 315 F.3d 139, 142–44 (2d Cir. 2002); 
United States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1313–14 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 218–21 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 619–
21 (8th Cir. 1999). 
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defendant’s constitutional rights. Because the statute and facts 
surrounding the Hayes case create the potential for double jeopardy 
concerns in the context of proving a predicate offense, this Article will 
explore the issue under those circumstances. 
The use of double jeopardy analysis in this context has never been 
substantively addressed by the Supreme Court of the United States or 
any other federal court. Therefore, this Article provides a fresh look at 
the double jeopardy issue that arises when proving the existence of a 
predicate offense. This Article contends that allowing the prosecution to 
present new evidence outside the record of the prior conviction in Hayes 
would have violated the defendant’s Fifth Amendment protection against 
double jeopardy.4 This contention is reached by examining the 
circumstances in Hayes under the Supreme Court’s current double 
jeopardy analysis.5 In doing so, the Article concludes that any attempt by 
the federal government to use evidence outside the judicial record of a 
prior conviction in order to prove the existence of a predicate offense 
must be subject to double jeopardy analysis.6 
Section II of the Article provides a background to lay the frame-
work for the issues raised by proving predicate offenses as substantive 
elements of a federal charge at the guilt phase of a prosecution. Because 
of the limited case law on permissible evidence for proving predicate 
offenses at the guilt phase, this section will first discuss Supreme Court 
decisions involving such evidence at the sentencing phase of a criminal 
prosecution.7 It will then discuss how the logic used at the sentencing 
phase carries over to the context of proving predicate offenses at the guilt 
phase. This section also provides background on United States v. Hayes 
(“Hayes”), a decision where the district court applied the Supreme 
Court’s sentencing phase analysis to the guilt phase of a prosecution.8 
Finally, this section reveals how the circumstances of proving predicate 
offenses at the guilt phase with evidence outside the judicial record of the 
prior conviction raises the issue of double jeopardy. 
In Section III, the Article explores a detailed analysis of the double 
jeopardy issue that arises from proving a predicate offense at the guilt 
phase of a prosecution with evidence that is not judicially noticeable 
because it is outside the judicial record of the prior conviction. First, this 
section recounts applicable Supreme Court precedent and the competing 
  
 4 See infra Section III.a. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 See infra Section II.a. 
 8 377 F. Supp. 2d 540 (N.D. W. Va. 2005). 
268 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 4:265 
theories surrounding double jeopardy analysis. Second, the section 
explains the doctrine of dual sovereignty and why it does not preclude 
the application of double jeopardy analysis in the predicate offense 
context. The discussion then applies double jeopardy analysis in the 
context of the Hayes decision in order to exemplify the double jeopardy 
concerns associated with proving predicate offenses generally. In doing 
so, this section concludes that a double jeopardy analysis will always be 
necessary to determine the constitutionality of proving the existence of a 
predicate offense that cannot be recognized through judicial notice. 
Section IV provides a brief synopsis of other constitutional 
concerns that are likely to arise if a trial court admits evidence of a prior 
conviction outside that which is in the judicial record of the prior 
conviction. Specifically, it addresses the defendant’s right to a speedy 
trial under the Sixth Amendment and the issue of state sovereignty under 
the Tenth Amendment. 
Finally, Section V concludes the Article by describing the 
expectation of what the future may hold with regard to proving the 
existence of a predicate offense at the guilt phase of a prosecution. 
II. PRIOR CONVICTIONS AND THEIR JUDICIAL RECORDS 
A. Introduction 
Before delving into the double jeopardy analysis of this Article, it is 
important to set forth a backdrop for the topic and the issue of proving 
predicate offenses generally. 
In recent years, Congress has passed various laws that incorporate a 
defendant’s prior state convictions into federal statutes.9 Most frequently, 
the prior convictions are incorporated for the purposes of sentencing 
enhancements and as substantive elements of federal crimes. Moreover, 
much of the controversy regarding the use of these predicate offenses 
relates to what evidence may be used to prove that the underlying 
conviction qualifies as the conviction required by the incorporating 
statute. Due to the relatively recent implementation of such statutes, 
however, there is almost no case law addressing what evidence the 
federal government may use to prove the existence of a predicate offense 
at the guilt phase of a prosecution. 
The Supreme Court, however, has addressed the similar issue of 
permissible evidence for proving predicate offenses at the sentencing 
  
 9 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 924 (2000). 
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phase of a criminal prosecution.10 In that context, the Supreme Court 
held that, when proving the existence of a predicate offense, the 
government may not present evidence outside the judicial record of a 
prior conviction due to the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial 
by jury.11 This holding is particularly relevant because the extension of 
its rationale to the guilt phase of a prosecution is what potentially triggers 
the double jeopardy concerns addressed by this Article.12 Thus, this 
section will explore that precedent and how it has been utilized in the 
context of proving the existence of a predicate offense at the guilt phase 
of a federal prosecution. 
B. Prior Convictions and Sentencing Enhancements 
In Taylor v. United States13 and Shepard v. United States,14 the 
Supreme Court addressed the scope of evidence that may be used by the 
federal government to prove the existence of a predicate offense for 
sentencing enhancement purposes.15 
Taylor and Shepard involved the definition of burglary as a 
predicate offense for sentence enhancement purposes under the Armed 
Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”).16 As defined by the Court, the federal 
statute created a generic predicate offense of burglary that included any 
offense having the “basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry 
into, or remaining in, a building or structure with intent to commit a 
crime.”17 In both cases the defendant had been convicted under a more 
broadly defined burglary statute that was not limited to entries into 
buildings or structures.18 Consequently, the Court had to determine what 
evidence should be admitted to determine if the building or structure 
element of the predicate offense had been met.19 
  
 10 See infra Section II.a. 
 11 Shepard v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1254 (2005); see infra II.a. 
 12 United States v. Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d. 540 (N.D. W. Va. 2005), rev’d on other 
grounds, United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 
U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2008) (No. 07-608). 
 13 495 U.S. 575 (1990). 
 14 125 S.Ct. 1254 (2005). 
 15 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 575; Shepard, 125 S.Ct. at 1254 (extending the holding in 
Taylor to guilty pleas). 
 16 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 577; Shepard, 125 S.Ct. 1257 (2005); see also 18 U.S.C. § 
924(e) (2000). 
 17 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599. 
 18 Id.; Shepard, 125 S. Ct. at 1257. 
 19 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599; Shepard, 125 S. Ct. at 1257. 
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In Taylor20 and Shepard,21 the Supreme Court held that, in order to 
protect the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury, the 
prosecution was limited to the judicially noticeable facts of the prior 
conviction. In explaining its rationale, the Shepard Court noted that 
“respect for congressional intent and avoidance of collateral trials require 
that evidence of a generic conviction be confined to records of the 
convicting court approaching the certainty of the record of conviction . . . 
.”22 The Court further explained the controlling doctrine from Taylor by 
stating that it prohibited the admission of evidence not introduced at trial, 
even if that evidence was “uncontradicted” and “internally consistent” 
with the evidence that was admitted.23 
In Shepard, the Court noted that using information outside the 
record of the prior offense to establish the existence of the predicate 
offense would require the sentencing judge to make a disputed finding of 
fact.24 The Court held that the Apprendi line of decisions and the Sixth 
Amendment prohibited any such finding because those decisions 
“guarantee a jury’s finding of any disputed fact essential to increase the 
ceiling of a potential sentence.”25 As a result, the sentencing court was 
not allowed to look to any evidence outside the judicial record in order to 
recognize the existence of the predicate offense.26 
  
 20 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600–02 (the ACCA “mandates a formal categorical approach, 
looking only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular 
facts underlying those convictions[,]” and this “categorical approach . . . may permit the 
sentencing court to go beyond the mere fact of conviction in a narrow range of cases 
where a jury was actually required to find all the elements of the generic [offense]”). 
 21 Shepard, 125 S. Ct. at 1263 (holding that “enquiry under the ACCA to determine 
whether a plea of guilty to burglary defined by a nongeneric statute necessarily admitted 
elements of the generic offense is limited to the terms of the charging document, the 
terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which 
the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to some comparable 
judicial record of this information”). 
 22 Id. at 1261. 
 23 Id.  
 24 Id. at 1262. 
 25 Id.; see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that other 
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt). Many commentators have even advocated that this logic should result 
in predicate offenses having to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt at the sentencing 
phase of litigation. See Wayne A. Logan, Horizontal Federalism in an Age of Criminal 
Justice Interconnectedness, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 257, 296 (2005). The Supreme Court did 
not, however, feel such a step was necessary. Rather, the Court found that limiting 
judicial notice to that of the judicial record was sufficient to protect the defendant’s 
constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment. 
 26 Shepard, 125 S.Ct. at 1262. 
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Neither Taylor nor Shepard discussed the applicability of their 
holdings at the guilt phase of a prosecution.27 Those decisions are 
pertinent to this Article, however, because lower federal courts have 
extended their application to that context. 
C. Predicate Offenses as Substantive Elements to a Criminal Charge 
In the only two federal cases to address whether the Shepard 
analysis applies to predicate offenses as substantive elements at the guilt 
phase of a prosecution, the courts held that it does.28 Moreover, in United 
States v. Hayes, the more detailed of those opinions, the district court 
found that the Shepard standard is met as long as the facts are proven to 
a jury, even if they are proven at a proceeding subsequent to the prior 
conviction.29 
The first federal decision to discuss the application of Shepard at 
the guilt phase of a prosecution was United States v. Nobriga, a May 
2005 decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit.30 In Nobriga, the Ninth Circuit specifically held that Taylor and 
Shepard were applicable at the guilt phase, and therefore limited the 
scope of evidence that could be used to prove the existence of the 
requisite predicate offense.31 Though the opinion was later withdrawn as 
being moot, it still represents a recognition that the Shepard analysis may 
apply outside the context of the ACCA sentencing enhancements.32 
Similarly, in June 2005, the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of West Virginia issued an opinion recognizing 
Shepard’s applicability in the context of proving a predicate offense at 
the guilt phase of a prosecution.33 In United States v. Hayes, the 
government intended to use facts outside the judicial record from a prior 
simple battery conviction to prove at trial that the prior state conviction 
actually satisfied the federal definition of an MCDV under 18 U.S.C. § 
  
 27 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602; see also Shepard, 125 S.Ct. at 1263 (addressing the 
dissent’s concern with the possibility of the government presenting evidence outside the 
judicial record of a prior conviction to a jury and the resulting prejudice that would 
occur). 
 28 United States v. Nobriga, 408 F.3d 1178, 1182 (9th Cir. 2005) (withdrawn, United 
States v. Nobriga, 2006 U.S.App. LEXIS 10 (2006)); United States v. Hayes, 377 F. 
Supp. 2d. 540 (N.D. W. Va. 2005), rev’d on other grounds, United States v. Hayes, 482 
F.3d 749 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2008) (No. 07-
608). 
 29 Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 542. 
 30 Nobriga, 408 F.3d at 1179. 
 31 Id. at 1182, n.4. 
 32 Id. at 1181. 
 33 Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 542. 
Comment [A1]: Footnote Numbering 
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922(g)(9).34 In Hayes, the district court held that the evidentiary limits of 
Shepard applied to judicial fact-finding, and not to finding of facts made 
by a jury.35 Therefore, the Shepard standard for limiting evidence to the 
judicial record of a guilty plea did not prevent the government from 
presenting that evidence to a jury.36 Consequently, the government was 
permitted to indict the defendant for illegal possession of a firearm under 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) because Shepard did not apply to facts proven to a 
jury.37 However, to better understand how the court reached this decision 
and what impact its holding ultimately has on double jeopardy, it is 
helpful to take a closer look at the circumstances of the case. 
D. United States v. Hayes 
In 1994, in West Virginia magistrate court, Randy Edward Hayes 
pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor offense of simple battery.38 Eleven 
years later, on January 4, 2005, Hayes was indicted by a federal grand 
jury under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(9), 924(a)(2), for illegally possessing a 
firearm while having been previously convicted of an MCDV.39 The 
circumstances of Hayes’ simple battery conviction are unclear from the 
decision; however, Hayes indicated that no judicially recognizable 
documentation of his prior conviction revealed the identity of his 
victim.40 Hayes argued that, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Shepard, the government could not prove the identity of his victim and 
thus could not prove that he had a prior conviction for an MCDV as 
defined by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).41 
In Hayes, the district court first outlined the standards for sustaining 
a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9): 
The Government must prove three elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt: (1) that the accused possessed, shipped, or transported a 
firearm; (2) that the firearm had traveled in or affected interstate 
  
 34 Id. 
 35 Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 543. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 543. 
 38 Id. at 540. 
 39 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2000) is the penalty provision for a violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 922(a)(6), (d), (g)–(j), (o) (2000). 
 40 Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 541. 
 41 Id.; see also Shepard v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 1254 (2005) (holding that in the 
context of sentence enhancements, the Sixth Amendment requires that a sentencing court 
limit itself to examining the statute of conviction, charging document, plea agreement, 
plea transcript, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant 
assented, when determining whether a prior conviction is a felony for enhancement 
purposes). 
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commerce; and (3) that the accused had been convicted of a mis-
demeanor crime of domestic violence.42 
The district court also recognized that a crime of domestic violence 
is defined as a misdemeanor with an element including the use or 
attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly 
weapon, committed by a person with whom the victim has a domestic 
relationship.43 Moreover, citing the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United 
States v. Bethurum, the court added that: 
[w]hether a predicate offense qualifies as a ‘misdemeanor crime 
of domestic violence’ pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33) is a 
question of law rather than a separate and essential element of a 
violation of § 922(g)(9) which must be proved to the jury beyond 
a reasonable doubt.44 
The district court, however, additionally discussed the Fourth 
Circuit’s unpublished decision in United States v. Ball,45 which, in 
accord with other circuits, held that a predicate offense under § 922(g)(9) 
only required that the predicate offense have one element—the element 
of physical force.46 Ball also held that the prosecution carried the burden 
of proving to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that a domestic 
relationship did in fact exist between the defendant and his victim.47 The 
court in Hayes then synthesized the Bethurum and Ball decisions and 
held that a judge must only find the element of force in the predicate 
offense through judicial notice, and, if it is found, the prosecution is left 
to prove the domestic relationship to the jury.48 
  
 42 Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)(2000); United States v. Bethurum, 343 F.3d 712, 
716 (5th Cir. 2003)). 
 43 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33) (2000) (defining the crime as being: committed by a 
current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the 
victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabitating with or has cohabitated 
with the victim as a spouse, parent or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a 
spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim). 
 44 Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 541 (citing Bethurum, 343 F.3d at 716–17); see also 
United States v. Bethurum, 343 F.3d 712, 717 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 45 United States v. Ball, 7 F. App’x 210 (4th Cir. 2001) (unpublished), overruled by 
United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3255 
(U.S. Mar. 24, 2008) (No. 07-608); see also, infra, Section II.C. (providing further 
analysis of the Ball decision). 
 46 Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 541–42 (citing Ball, 7 F. App’x 210); see also United 
States v. Rodriguez-Deharo, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1031 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (adopting a similar 
rationale and following suit with the First, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits). 
 47 Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 542 (citing White v. Dep’t of Justice, 328 F.3d 1361 
(Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 48 Id. 
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In his defense, Hayes argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Shepard controlled what evidence the federal government could use to 
prove that his prior guilty plea to simple battery was in fact a prior 
conviction for a crime of domestic violence.49 Thus, Hayes maintained 
that the evidence permitted for use by the prosecution should be limited 
to the “statute of conviction, charging document, plea agreement, plea 
transcript and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the 
defendant assented.”50 
In rendering its decision, the district court first held that the 
Shepard analysis was applicable at the guilt phase of a prosecution.51 The 
court qualified its holding, however, by indicating that Shepard only 
applied to judicial fact-finding and not fact-finding by a jury.52 The court 
stated that Shepard did not apply to cases where the evidence outside the 
judicial record of the prior conviction would ultimately be proven to a 
jury.53 The court reasoned that Shepard did not apply to such cases 
because they did not raise constitutional issues regarding a defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.54 Therefore, the court held that the 
prosecution should be permitted to use evidence outside the judicial 
record of Hayes’ prior conviction to prove at trial that the prior 
conviction did in fact meet the federal definition of a crime of domestic 
violence.55 Consequently, the court denied Hayes’ motion to dismiss the 
superseding indictment because it was valid on its face and did not 
violate his Sixth Amendment rights under Shepard.56 
On appeal of the Hayes decision, the Fourth Circuit reversed the 
district court’s ruling regarding the appropriate manner for proving the 
existence of the predicate offense.57 More specifically, the court of 
appeals concluded that the text, structure, and legislative history of 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) and the rule of lenity required that a domestic 
relationship be an explicit element to the predicate offense.58 Though the 
  
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. (citing United States v. Washington, 404 F.3d 834 (4th Cir. 2005) (following 
Shepard in the context of an attempt to equate a predicate offense of breaking and 
entering to a crime of violence through judicial notice for sentence enhancement 
purposes). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 542–43. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 543. 
 57 United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749, 750 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 
U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2008) (No. 07-608). 
 58 Id. 
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Hayes Appeal effectively nullified the topic of this Article with regard to 
Hayes personally, it is important to note that the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision in the Hayes Appeal is inconsistent with each of the other 
circuits to address the issue.59 Rather, most other circuits are in accord 
with the Ball decision relied upon by the district court in Hayes, which 
held that a predicate offense under section 922(g)(9) need only have the 
element of force and that the domestic relationship may be proven 
outside of the statutory elements.60 Moreover, the Supreme Court 
recently granted certiorari to review the Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
Hayes to effectively resolve this split between the circuits.61 If the 
Supreme Court agrees with those circuits that do not require the domestic 
relationship to be included as a statutory element of the predicate 
offense, the double jeopardy concerns addressed in this Article will be 
revived in the Hayes case. 
Furthermore, the district court’s decision in Hayes appears 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Shepard and effectively 
protects the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury. Thus, 
if the Supreme Court reverses the Fourth Circuit’s decision in the Hayes 
Appeal, and holds that the domestic relationship need not be an element 
of the predicate offense, the district court’s rationale in Hayes would 
likely be adopted in other circuits. Additionally, because the issue 
addressed by the Supreme Court is limited to the context of 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(9), it is unclear what impact the Supreme Court’s decision may 
have on the manner of proving predicate offenses generally. 
Consequently, the facts presented by Hayes, and the district court’s 
ruling regarding the manner in which a predicate offense may be proven, 
remain topics for consideration in the debate regarding the proper scope 
of proving predicate offenses.62 Moreover, neither Hayes nor Shepard 
  
 59 See United States v. Heckenliable, 446 F.3d 1048, 1049 (10th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Belless, 338 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003); White v. Dep’t of Justice, 328 
F.3d 1361, 1364–67 (Fed. Cir. 2003); United States v. Shelton, 325 F.3d 553, 562 (5th 
Cir. 2003); United States v. Barnes, 353 U.S. App. D.C. 87, 295 F.3d 1354, 1358–61 
(D.C. Cir. 2002); United States v. Kavoukian, 315 F.3d 139, 142–44 (2d Cir. 2002); 
United States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1313–14 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 218–21 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 619–
21 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 60 United States v. Ball, 7 F. App’x 210 (4th Cir. 2001), abrogated by United States 
v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Mar. 24, 
2008) (No. 07-608); see, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Deharo, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1031 
(E.D. Cal. 2002) (adopting a similar rationale and following the First, Eighth, and 
Eleventh Circuits). 
 61 United States v. Hayes, 76 U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2008) (No. 07-608). 
 62 See Heckenliable, 446 F.3d at 1049; Belless, 338 F.3d at 1067; White, 328 F.3d at 
1364–67; Shelton, 325 F.3d at 562; Barnes, 295 F.3d at 1358–61; Kavoukian, 315 F.3d at 
 
276 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 4:265 
addressed the Fifth Amendment issue of double jeopardy which may 
arise from allowing evidence of a prior conviction to be re-litigated at the 
guilt phase of a subsequent prosecution. Therefore, the remainder of this 
Article addresses the double jeopardy issue that might arise in such a 
situation, and predicts how that issue should be resolved. The Article 
seeks to accomplish this by providing an overview of double jeopardy 
analysis and then applying it to the facts of Hayes in order to exemplify 
the potential double jeopardy concerns associated with proving the 
existence of a predicate offense. 
III. DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND PROVING PREDICATE OFFENSES 
A. Double Jeopardy Analysis: An Overview 
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is 
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, indicates 
that no person “shall be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb.”63 Under the Fifth Amendment, the Double 
Jeopardy Clause provides three protections: it prevents a second 
prosecution of an offense after acquittal, it prevents a second prosecution 
after conviction, and it prevents multiple punishments for the same 
offense.64 However, the most commonly litigated issue within the Double 
Jeopardy Clause is determining what constitutes the “same offense.” 
The Supreme Court has stated that the first step in the double 
jeopardy analysis is to determine whether the legislature intended that 
each violation be considered a separate offense.65 When questions remain 
as to the legislative intent, however, the primary analysis for determining 
when two proceedings involve the same offense under the Double 
Jeopardy Clause is the “same elements” test laid out in Blockburger v. 
  
142–44; Chavez, 204 F.3d at 1313–14; Meade, 175 F.3d at 218–21; Smith, 171 F.3d at 
619–21. 
 63 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 164 (1977). 
 64 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969), overruled on other grounds by 
Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989); see also Karen J. Ciupak, RICO and the 
Predicate Offense: An Analysis of Double Jeopardy and Verdict Consistency Problems, 
58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 382, 393 (1982) (discussing the “three protections afforded by 
the double jeopardy clause”). 
 65 Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779 (1985); see also Ciupak, supra note 64, 
at 390 (“the Blockburger test [i]s a rule of statutory construction, to be used to determine 
whether Congress intended to create two offenses or one”). 
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United States.66 In essence, the Blockburger test “treats two offenses as 
different if and only if each requires an element the other does not.”67 
In Blockburger, the defendant was convicted of three counts of 
distributing morphine hydrochloride in violation of the Harrison Narcotic 
Act.68 On appeal, the defendant argued that two of the convictions under 
section 1 and section 2 of the Act, respectively, should be punished as 
one offense because both charges involved the same sale to one 
individual.69 The Supreme Court responded that “where the same act or 
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the 
test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only 
one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other 
does not.”70 According to the Court, section 1 of the Act prohibited the 
sale of contraband not in its original stamped package, and section 2 
prohibited the sale of any such contraband without a proper 
prescription.71 Consequently, because each charge under the statute 
required proof of an element that the other did not, the single sale made 
by the defendant could be prosecuted as two separate offenses.72 
In recent years, federal courts have consistently resolved double 
jeopardy questions involving similar offenses using Blockburger’s 
statutory construction test which is often referred to as simply the “same-
elements” test.73 The Supreme Court, however, has wrestled with 
expanding double jeopardy analysis to incorporate other tests for 
determining if separate offenses constitute the “same offense.”74 
Most recently, in Grady v. Corbin, the Supreme Court held that the 
Blockburger test does not conclude the double jeopardy analysis.75 In 
Grady, the prosecution intended to re-prove the conduct of a defendant’s 
  
 66 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); see also, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 
(1993) (“The same-elements test, sometimes referred to as the ‘Blockburger’ test, 
inquires whether each offense contains an element not contained in the other; if not, they 
are the ‘same offence’ and double jeopardy bars additional punishment and successive 
prosecution.”). 
 67 Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 Yale L.J. 1807, 1813 
(1997). 
 68 Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 300. 
 69 Id. at 300–01. 
 70 Id. at 304. 
 71 Id. at 303–04. 
 72 Id. 
 73 See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993). 
 74 Grady, 495 U.S. 508, 517 (rejecting a “same evidence” test and adopting a “same 
conduct” test), overruled by Dixon, 509 U.S. at 712 (rejecting the “same conduct” 
analysis); see also Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 790 (1985) (rejecting the “same 
transaction” test). 
 75 Grady, 495 U.S. at 516. 
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prior conviction in order to rely upon it as the reckless or negligent act 
necessary to sustain homicide and assault charges.76 In its decision, the 
Court stated that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against a second 
prosecution for the same offense following acquittal or conviction and 
also protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.77 
Therefore, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause: 
bars any subsequent prosecution in which the government, to 
establish an essential element of an offense charged in that 
prosecution, will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for 
which the defendant has already been prosecuted . . . [.  And] the 
critical inquiry is what conduct the state will prove, not the 
evidence that the state will use to prove the conduct (the “Same 
Conduct” test).78 
Three terms later, however, the dissent in Grady prevailed in United 
States v. Dixon, the Court’s most recent decision regarding the 
controlling analysis for double jeopardy issues.79 
In an opinion written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Dixon Court 
held that the Grady “same conduct” analysis lacked historical roots and 
was unworkable and was therefore overruled.80 In Dixon, the defendant 
had previously been convicted of criminal contempt for violating a 
conditional release order and was subsequently prosecuted for the 
specific act which violated his conditional release.81 The Court held that 
the Blockburger test precluded prosecution of the subsequent charge 
unless it passed the “same elements” test.82 Consequently, the defendant 
could not be prosecuted for the activity that resulted in the contempt 
charge unless the subsequent prosecution involved a charge with 
differing elements from the contempt charge.83  
Because Dixon’s contempt charge required the prosecution to prove 
that he committed a violation of the drug laws as the basis for the 
violation of his conditional release, the subsequently-charged drug 
offense did not have an element that did not have to be proven to sustain 
the contempt charge.84 Therefore, both charges qualified as the same 
  
 76 Id. at 513–14. 
 77 Id. at 514. 
 78 Id. at 521. 
 79 Dixon, 509 U.S. at 688 (1993); see also Grady, 495 U.S. at 526 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 80 Dixon, 509 U.S. at 711. 
 81 Id. at 691. 
 82 Id. at 700. 
 83 Id. at 702. 
 84 Id. 
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offense under the “same elements” test and the subsequent prosecution 
violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.85 As a result, though the outcome 
in Dixon would likely have been the same under the “same conduct” 
analysis, the Supreme Court reverted back to placing the emphasis in 
double jeopardy analysis on the elements of the crime, rather than the 
conduct that must be proven. 
The Dixon decision, however, did not expressly rule that the 
Blockburger “same elements” test was the exclusive test relevant to 
double jeopardy analysis.86 Though the Court did hold that the “same 
elements” test was the primary analysis, a majority of the Justices could 
not define the scope of that analysis.87 Consequently, the Justices’s 
inability in Dixon to come to a consensus on the scope of Blockburger 
has been a topic of great discussion.88 Some scholars have also argued 
that the Blockburger test is not flexible enough to address all double 
jeopardy questions.89 In fact, the Supreme Court appears to agree on this 
point, and it has provided flexibility in the Blockburger analysis by 
allowing a deviation in two unique situations.90 
First, in Ashe v. Swenson, the Court held that the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel was applicable to the Double Jeopardy Clause and that 
a court must rationally protect91 a defendant from having to re-litigate 
issues that have already been determined by a valid judgment.92 In Ashe, 
  
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 697–712. 
 87 Id. 
 88 See, e.g., Kathryn A. Pamenter, Comment, United States v. Dixon: The Supreme 
Court Returns to the Traditional Standard for Double Jeopardy Analysis, 69 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 575, 576–77 (1994); Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made 
Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807, 1813 (1997). 
 89 See, e.g., Anne Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy Against Successive Prosecutions 
in Complex Cases: A Model, 25 CONN. L. REV. 95, 101 (1992). 
 90 See generally Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 
U.S. 436 (1970). 
 91 The Court in Ashe stated that: 
[T]his approach requires a court to examine the record of the prior 
proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and 
other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could 
have grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the 
defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration. The inquiry must be 
set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to all the 
circumstances of the proceedings. Any test more technically 
restrictive would, of course, simply amount to a rejection of the rule 
of collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings, at least in every case 
where the first judgment was based upon a general verdict of 
acquittal. 
  Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444. 
 92 Id. 
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the defendant was acquitted of robbing a particular individual as part of a 
robbery that in fact included six victims.93 The Court in Ashe held that 
the prior determination that the defendant charged with robbing one of 
the victims was not present during the robbery prevented the prosecution 
from simply retrying the defendant for the robbery of one of the other six 
individuals.94 The opinion stated that the “single rationally conceivable 
issue in dispute before the jury was whether the petitioner had been one 
of the robbers. And the jury had found that he had not.”95 Therefore, the 
second prosecution for the robbery would be wholly impermissible.96 
Consequently, it appears the Court will allow a deviation from the 
traditional Blockburger analysis in a context where a second prosecution 
necessarily re-litigates issues that were resolved in the defendant’s favor 
in prior litigation.97 
The second variation of the Blockburger test occurred in Harris v. 
Oklahoma.98 In Harris, the Court expressly held that “[w]hen . . . 
conviction of a greater crime . . . cannot be [held] without conviction of a 
lesser crime . . . the Double Jeopardy Clause bars [the] prosecution for 
the lesser crime after conviction of the greater one.”99 Harris involved 
the greater conviction of felony murder which barred the lesser 
conviction of robbery with firearms that was used as the predicate felony 
offense.100 In this context, the prosecution necessarily selected an 
underlying felony—robbery with firearms—that had to be proven during 
the trial as the felony element of the felony murder charge.101  
Hence, an attempt to subsequently charge the defendant with the 
underlying felony would fail Blockburger because the underlying felony 
was incorporated in its entirety into the felony murder charge, and, 
therefore, did not contain an element that the felony murder charge did 
not.102 It also appears that this deviation parallels the logic stated in Ashe 
because the double jeopardy bar is based on the fact that the felony 
murder conviction could not be sustained if the jury had not already 
conclusively determined that a robbery with firearms had in fact 
  
 93 Id. at 437. 
 94 Id. at 445. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 528 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 98 433 U.S. 682 (1977). 
 99 Id. at 682. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
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occurred.103 Therefore, the second deviation to Blockburger appears to 
apply in the situation where a statutory offense incorporates as an 
element a category of offenses, which therefore precludes traditional 
Blockburger analysis because the statute does not explicitly incorporate 
the elements of a particular offense.104 
Consequently, it follows that the most accurate description of the 
Supreme Court’s standard for double jeopardy analysis is that the Fifth 
Amendment prohibits the successive prosecution or punishment for the 
same offense.105 Moreover, in determining if two offenses are the same, 
the courts will look for clear legislative intent and then will determine if 
each offense contains an element distinct from the other.106 Finally, even 
if the offenses do have distinct elements, they will be deemed the “same 
offense” if the prosecution of the prior offense determinatively litigated 
the facts at issue in the subsequent offense.107 
Though the Supreme Court appears steadfast in its application of 
the analysis discussed above, the legal community is much wearier about 
its application.108 Professor Jacqueline E. Ross has pointed out that there 
are as many as six different double jeopardy analyses that could be used 
in place of Blockburger’s “same elements” standard.109 In fact, scholars 
advocate four of those tests as superior to Blockburger.110 Specifically, 
these tests include a more rigid “same elements”111 test, a “same act or 
transaction”112 test, a “blameworthiness”113 test, and even Grady’s “same 
conduct”114 test. 
  
 103 See also United States v. Falkowski, 900 F. Supp. 1207, 1213 (D. Ala. 1995) 
(interpreting Harris to allow a felony prosecution subsequent to a prosecution for felony 
murder if it could be shown that the felony charge in the subsequent prosecution was not 
the felony that had been used to sustain the felony murder conviction). 
 104 See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 528 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 105 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969), overruled on other grounds by 
Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989). 
 106 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 302–04 (1932). 
 107 See Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 
445 (1970). 
 108 See, e.g., Susan R. Klein, Review Essay: Double Jeopardy’s Demise, 88 CAL. L. 
REV. 1001 (2000) (reviewing GEORGE C. THOMAS III, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY, 
THE LAW (1998)). 
 109 Jacqueline E. Ross, Damned Under Many Headings: The Problem of Multiple 
Punishment, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 245, 258–66 (2002). 
 110 Id. 
 111 Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807, 1813 
(1997). 
 112 Kirstin Pace, Fifth Amendment—The Adoption of the “Same Elements” Test: The 
Supreme Court’s Failure to Adequately Protect Defendants From Double Jeopardy, 84 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 769 (1994). 
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The more rigid “same elements” test is advocated by Professor 
Akhil Reed Amar, Southmayd Professor of Law and Political Science at 
Yale Law School.115 Professor Amar argues that “same” should mean 
“same” under double jeopardy and that a court should not look beyond a 
statute to make that determination. In essence, Professor Amar states that 
a court should consider legislative intent and the statutory elements in 
order to preclude a second prosecution under the Fifth Amendment.116 
He also argues that other considerations such as the collateral estoppel 
problem addressed in Ashe v. Swenson, could be adequately addressed 
under due process analysis.117 Consequently, Professor Amar’s view 
most notably differs from Blockburger in that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause should not hold lesser or greater offenses to be the “same 
offense.”118 
The “same act” or “same transaction” test has been proffered by 
Kirstin Pace and, among others, Justice William J. Brennan.119 This test 
“requires the prosecution, except in the most limited circumstances, to 
join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a 
single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction.”120 It is argued 
that this test is the best analysis for double jeopardy questions because it 
places proper restraint on the government to prevent harassing litigation, 
and ensures finality of adjudication.121 Though the Supreme Court has 
squarely rejected the “same act” test, many scholars consider it a viable 
substitute for Blockburger’s “same elements” analysis.122 
  
 113 George C. Thomas III, A Blameworthy Act Approach to the Double Jeopardy 
Same Offense Problem, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1027 (1995). 
 114 Susan R. Klein, Review Essay: Double Jeopardy’s Demise, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1001 
(2000) (reviewing GEORGE C. THOMAS III, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY, THE LAW 
(1998)). 
 115 Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807, 1813 
(1997). 
 116 Id. at 1833. 
 117 Id. at 1837. 
 118 Id. at 1807. 
 119 Kirstin Pace, Fifth Amendment—The Adoption of the “Same Elements” Test: The 
Supreme Court’s Failure to Adequately Protect Defendants From Double Jeopardy, 84 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 769 (1994). See also Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 
(1985) (rejecting the “same transaction” test); Klein, supra note 114, at 1031 (noting 
Justice Brennan’s support of the “same transaction” test). 
 120 Kirstin Pace, Fifth Amendment—The Adoption of the “Same Elements” Test: The 
Supreme Court’s Failure to Adequately Protect Defendants From Double Jeopardy, 84 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 769, 801 (1994) (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 
453–54 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
 121 Id. at 802. 
 122 Id.; see also Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 733 (1985) (rejecting the “same 
transaction” test). 
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The “blameworthiness” test has been promoted by Professor 
George C. Thomas of Rutgers University School of Law.123 Professor 
Thomas argues that “offenses are the same for double jeopardy analysis 
when they manifest a single blameworthiness . . . . [and, often,] courts 
must infer whether the legislature intended to impose more than one 
conviction for the actor’s conduct.”124 Professor Thomas contends that 
this test would relieve what he perceives to be the problem with 
Blockburger: sufficiently different descriptions of an offense will allow 
for subsequent prosecutions, even if inconsistent with legislative 
intent.125 
It is evident from the discourse on the appropriate test for double 
jeopardy analysis that the future of the Blockburger test is questionable. 
Therefore, this Article will briefly address how its conclusion might fare 
under these other proposed double jeopardy tests. At this juncture, 
however, the Supreme Court has not indicated any departure from 
Blockburger’s “same elements” analysis. Consequently, this Article will 
focus its analysis of the double jeopardy issue involved with proving a 
predicate offense under that Supreme Court standard. In an effort to 
provide an example of this analysis, the Article specifically addresses the 
issue in the context of United States v. Hayes. 
B. The Dual Sovereignty Issue 
As a preliminary matter, this section will confront the issue of dual 
sovereignty and explain why that doctrine is not controlling in the 
context of this Article. 
Under the doctrine of dual sovereignty, the Supreme Court has long 
held that double jeopardy does not bar successive prosecutions by state 
and federal authorities for the same conduct.126 In Abbate v. United 
States, the Court discussed the culmination of precedent leading up to 
this conclusion, and in doing so, clearly set forth the legal basis for the 
doctrine as well as the public policy supporting its application. 127 
In Abbate, the Court first mentioned its prior decision in United 
States v. Lanza, which set forth the legal framework for dealing with the 
constitutional concerns surrounding a federal prosecution following a 
  
 123 George C. Thomas, A Blameworthy Act Approach to the Double Jeopardy Same 
Offense Problem, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1027 (1995). 
 124 Id. at 1027. 
 125 Id. at 1036. 
 126 See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 189–96 (1959); see also Ciupak, supra 
note 64 (discussing Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 196 (1959)). 
 127 Abbate, 359 U.S. at 189–96. 
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state conviction for the same conduct.128 In Lanza, the act of possessing 
liquor was a violation of both state and federal law—with the state 
deriving its authority from the police powers reserved by the Tenth 
Amendment and the federal law deriving its authority from the 
Eighteenth Amendment.129 In permitting successive prosecutions under 
each sovereign’s respective laws, the Lanza Court held that where an act 
is denounced as a crime by “two sovereignties, deriving power from 
different sources, . . . [it is] an offense against the peace and dignity of 
both and may be punished by each.”130 Following its acknowledgement 
of this principle, the Abbate Court emphasized that the lower federal 
courts had consistently read Lanza to hold that “a federal prosecution is 
not barred by a prior state prosecution of the same person for the same 
acts.”131 
Before affirming the lower courts’ interpretation of Lanza, 
however, the Abbate Court also addressed the public policy concern 
surrounding the principle of dual sovereignty.132 The opinion noted that 
the basic dilemma had been recognized for over a century and was based 
on the concern that infractions might only minimally affect the interest of 
one sovereign while having a much more profound effect on the interests 
of another.133 Thus, absent a dual sovereignty limitation on double 
jeopardy, a relatively minor infraction of state law with a 
correspondingly lenient punishment might preclude the prosecution of 
much more serious federal crimes.134 
Based on the legal principles set forth by Lanza and the concerns 
over equity in enforcement, the Abbate Court firmly held that under the 
doctrine of dual sovereignty, the Fifth Amendment’s protection against 
double jeopardy did not prohibit the federal government from 
prosecuting an individual under its laws for acts already prosecuted 
under state law.135 
Turning now to the topic of this Article, it should first be noted that 
in both Abbate and its progeny, the dual sovereignty doctrine has only 
been invoked in the context where both sovereigns have actually 
  
 128 Id. (quoting United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922)). 
 129 Id. at 193. 
 130 Id. at 194 (quoting Lanza, 260 U.S. at 382). 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. at 195. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. at 196. 
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exercised their authority to prohibit the same form of conduct.136 Thus, it 
is clear that the federal prosecution in Hayes does not fit neatly into 
settled precedent regarding the dual sovereignty doctrine. More 
specifically, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), the federal government has 
exercised its commerce power to prohibit anyone who has been 
convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence from traveling in 
interstate commerce with a firearm.137 That statute, however, in no way 
criminalizes domestic violence at the federal level.138 Rather, it merely 
incorporates a prior conviction of an MCDV as an element to the federal 
crime. Thus, the federal government has not exercised its sovereign 
authority to create a federal crime of domestic violence which would 
invoke the application of the dual sovereignty doctrine. 
This Article argues that the circumstances of the Hayes case 
represent, in effect, one sovereign subjecting an individual to the 
equivalent of a second prosecution under the laws of another sovereign. 
More specifically, the federal law requires the existence of a separate 
domestic violence conviction which the federal government does not 
have the authority to prosecute. Thus, the presentation of evidence in 
relation to the circumstances of the prior conviction constitutes an effort 
to prove that the prior conviction should be treated as a domestic 
violence conviction, regardless of how the prior conviction is defined by 
the convicting sovereign.  
The reasoning in this Article stipulates that presenting additional 
evidence in such a manner is not necessarily unconstitutional. However, 
in cases such as Hayes, where the state has an independent domestic 
violence statute that was not used to convict the individual, the federal 
government is essentially transforming a conviction under one state law 
into a conviction under another. This Article argues that if the manner in 
which that evidence is presented would be prohibited in a state court 
because of double jeopardy, then the federal government should not be 
permitted to circumvent the state system to achieve what would 
otherwise be prohibited by the Constitution. In sum, the argument 
presented by this Article is that the federal prosecution in Hayes would 
have, in effect, twice put the defendant in jeopardy under the laws of a 
  
 136 See generally Abbate, 359 U.S. at 196; see also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 
313 (1978) (holding that a Navajo Tribe retained sovereign authority to enforce tribal 
laws, and, thus, the federal government was not prohibited from prosecuting same acts 
under federal law). 
 137 See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2006). 
 138 See id.; see also 142 Cong. Rec. S10377–01 (1996) (statement of Sen. 
Lautenberg), at WL 517928. 
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single sovereign by transforming a state simple battery conviction into a 
state domestic battery conviction. 
The Supreme Court has never addressed the applicability of the 
dual sovereignty doctrine in the context of predicate offenses. Permitting 
the federal government to prove the existence of a predicate offense in 
the manner presented above, however, should not fall under the dual 
sovereignty doctrine, because it would not be consistent with federal 
precedent. More specifically, the application of double jeopardy in this 
context would in no way limit a sovereign’s independent authority to 
criminalize and prosecute offenses against the “peace and dignity” of the 
sovereign.139 Rather, it would simply limit the manner in which a 
sovereign could prove the existence of a predicate offense that had been 
incorporated from the laws of another sovereign. Moreover, the public 
policy of the dual sovereignty doctrine also should not preclude the 
application of double jeopardy in this context. Particularly, it should not 
be precluded because it would in no way prohibit successive 
prosecutions by sovereigns that have chosen, for independent policy 
reasons, to actively criminalize the same form of conduct pursuant to 
their respective sovereign authority.140 
Furthermore, dictum from the Supreme Court’s decision in Bartkus 
v. Illinois lends support to the foregoing conclusion that the dual 
sovereignty doctrine should not be extended to include situations such as 
those presented in Hayes.141 In Bartkus, the Court hinted that if a state 
prosecution was pursued at the behest of the federal government in an 
attempt to avoid the federal double jeopardy prohibition, then the state 
prosecution may not be protected by dual sovereignty because it is a 
“sham and a cover” for a federal prosecution.142 In fact, the courts of 
appeals adopt this language to create an exception to the dual sovereignty 
doctrine.143 The exception was aptly described by the District of 
Columbia Circuit when it held that “Bartkus, as we view it, stands for the 
proposition that federal authorities are proscribed from manipulating 
state processes to accomplish that which they cannot constitutionally do 
themselves.”144 The court explained that “[t]o hold otherwise would, of 
  
 139 See United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). 
 140 See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959). 
 141 359 U.S. 121, 123 (1959). 
 142 Id. at 124. 
 143 See, e.g., United States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. 
Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1984). 
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course, result in a mockery of the dual sovereignty concept that underlies 
our system of criminal justice.”145 
Though the courts of appeals interpreted Bartkus in reference to 
what cannot be accomplished at the federal level due to double jeopardy, 
in contrast to Hayes, which deals with what cannot be accomplished at 
the federal level due to a lack of jurisdiction, the holdings still represent a 
restrictive interpretation of the dual sovereignty doctrine. More 
particularly, such an analysis lends support to a conclusion that the 
federal government should not be permitted to use the dual sovereignty 
doctrine to manipulate the laws of another sovereign in a manner that 
would otherwise be prohibited by the Constitution. Thus, in cases like 
Hayes, the federal government should not be permitted to exploit the 
dual sovereignty doctrine by using it to prove the existence of a state law 
conviction which the state itself would not be able to pursue because of 
double jeopardy. 
Consequently, the principles and precedent surrounding the dual 
sovereignty doctrine reveal that there is no clear basis for precluding the 
applicability of the double jeopardy doctrine when one sovereign merely 
incorporates a predicate offense from another sovereign without 
criminalizing the predicate conduct under its own laws. Therefore, this 
Article analyzes whether the federal government’s actions in Hayes 
would have led to a result that is contrary to the principles of double 
jeopardy. 
C. Legislative Intent and the Legal Framework of Hayes’ Convictions 
Before providing an in-depth analysis of the double jeopardy issue 
presented by United States v. Hayes or predicate offenses generally, it is 
helpful to examine the legal framework used to charge the defendant 
Hayes. It is also necessary to understand the legislative intent of this 
framework in order to analyze the Hayes case under double jeopardy 
analysis. 
In 1996, Congress stated in clear terms that this country would have 
“zero tolerance when it comes to guns and domestic violence.”146 In 
order to accomplish this mandate, and to strengthen the Violence Against 
Women Act of 1994 (“VAWA”), Congress invoked its commerce 
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power147 to amend 18 U.S.C. § 922, making it unlawful for any person 
convicted of an MCDV to possess a firearm or ammunition.148 
The statute was amended with the sole intent of keeping guns away 
from those convicted of domestic violence crimes.149 In doing so, Senator 
Frank R. Lautenberg (D-NJ) stated that the existing federal law 
preventing felons from possessing firearms was insufficient to keep 
firearms out of the hands of those who commit crimes of domestic 
violence.150 Senator Lautenberg commented that many times, those guilty 
of domestic violence are only charged with a misdemeanor. Therefore, 
the senator remarked that an amendment to prevent misdemeanor 
domestic violence offenders from possessing firearms was necessary to 
protect the lives of wives and children.151 
Due to its relatively short life span, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) generated 
many unanswered questions regarding the constitutionality of its 
application—particularly when the government attempts to equate one 
state offense to another in order to satisfy the predicate offense 
requirement. In order to fully understand the constitutional implications 
of such a practice, it is necessary to look at the legal framework of those 
offenses and the legislative intent behind them. Most importantly, in 
examining the implications of Hayes, it is necessary to recognize and 
compare West Virginia’s separate statutes for the crimes of simple 
battery and domestic battery.152 
In Hayes, the federal government attempted to satisfy the prior 
conviction element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) by alleging that Hayes’ state 
  
 147 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 148 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2000); see also United States v. Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d 
540, 541 (N.D. W. Va. 2005) (stating that the three elements for conviction under § 
922(g)(9) are: “(1) that the accused possessed, shipped, or transported a firearm; (2) that 
the firearm had traveled in or affected interstate commerce; and (3) that the accused had 
been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence”), rev’d on other grounds, 
United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3255 
(U.S. Mar. 24, 2008) (No. 07-608). 
 149 142 Cong. Rec. S10377–01 (1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg), at WL 517928. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Note that it is not clear from the Hayes decision or the applicable sections of the 
West Virginia Code whether the crime of domestic battery was in effect at the time 
Hayes was charged, as the statute’s passage and Hayes’ guilty plea both occurred at some 
point in 1994. See Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 541; W. VA. CODE § 61-2-28 (2004). 
Regardless, the analysis in this Article remains relevant any time a state elects to 
prosecute a defendant, but chooses not to charge him with an offense that parallels the 
federal definition of the predicate offense. 
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conviction for simple battery was in fact a conviction for an MCDV.153 
However, because West Virginia has different statutes for the crimes of 
simple battery and domestic battery, an understanding of the legislative 
intent behind the creation of these statutes is necessary to analyze the 
double jeopardy issue in Hayes.  
After a careful review of West Virginia’s domestic violence 
statute154 (which includes the charge of “domestic battery”) and its 
statute for malicious or unlawful assault, assault, and battery155 (the 
“physical violence” statute,” which includes the charge of “simple 
battery”), it is apparent that a clear difference exists between the two 
statutes. The domestic violence statute specifies that the victim of the 
accused must be “his or her family or household member.”156 Of 
particular significance, the code also states that no individual may be 
prosecuted under both statutes for the same act.157 Therefore, though the 
two statutes are very similar, they reflect clear legislative intent to 
recognize that a battery committed against someone of a domestic 
relationship is different from a battery committed against any other 
individual. 
Furthermore, when comparing the two statutes with the federal 
definition of an MCDV, it is clear that the domestic violence statute in 
West Virginia represents the precise offense that was intended to be 
incorporated by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).158 
  
 153 United States v. Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d. 540 (N.D. W. Va. 2005), rev’d on other 
grounds, United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 
U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2008) (No. 07-608). 
 154 W. VA. CODE § 61-2-28 (2004); see Appendix for the full text of this provision. 
 155 W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9 (2004); see Appendix for the full text of this provision. 
 156 W. VA. CODE §§ 61-2-28(a), (b) (2004). See also W. VA. CODE §§ 61-2-9(b), (c) 
(2004). 
 157 Id. at § 61-2-28(f). 
 158 See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33) (2000) (defining a misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence as: 
an offense that (i) is a misdemeanor under Federal, State, or Tribal 
law; and (ii) has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical 
force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a 
current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a 
person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person 
who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, 
parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse, 
parent, or guardian of the victim). 
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D. Analyzing Hayes and Proving a Predicate Offense under Double 
Jeopardy Analysis 
When applying double jeopardy analysis to the issue of proving a 
predicate offense as a substantive element of a federal criminal charge, 
two situations are possible. First, the prosecution may claim that the state 
conviction is literally the “same” as the federally defined predicate 
offense. Second, the prosecution may claim that the state conviction is 
not literally the “same” as the federally defined predicate offense, but for 
some other reason the prior conviction should qualify as the requisite 
predicate offense. 
In the first scenario, double jeopardy does not become an issue if 
the offenses are literally the “same,” because taking judicial notice of 
such a fact will not require any information beyond the elements of the 
offenses. This does not present a double jeopardy problem, because  
taking judicial notice of the record of a prior state conviction at the 
federal level would not constitute a second prosecution, since it would 
not require the litigation of any disputed fact.159 Moreover, the Supreme 
Court has specifically stated that it is “well established that there is no 
double jeopardy bar to the use of prior convictions” in the context of 
subsequent offenses.160 Therefore, a double jeopardy problem is not 
introduced by simply using a prior state conviction as a predicate offense 
to a federal crime. 
However, when the prior conviction and the predicate offense are 
not literally the same act, and the prosecution attempts to re-litigate the 
facts of the prior conviction in order to show that it should qualify as the 
  
 159 See generally North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717–18 (1969), overruled 
on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989) (stating that the Double 
Jeopardy Clause protects against a second prosecution following either acquittal or 
conviction and “[t]he Constitution was designed as much to prevent the criminal from 
being twice punished for the same offence as from being twice tried for it”). 
 160 Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 391 (1994); see also Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 
673, 676–77 (1895) (stating: 
The increased severity of the punishment for the subsequent offence 
is not a punishment for the same offence for the second time, but a 
severer punishment for the subsequent offence, the law which 
imposes the increased punishment being presumed to be known by all 
persons, and to deter those so inclined from the further commission 
of crime; and we are unable to see how the statute which imposes 
such increased punishment violates the provisions of our Constitution 
hereinbefore quoted. . . . The fact that the indictment charged a 
former conviction of another and entirely different offence, is not in 
fact charging him with an offence with respect of the former offence 
in the case in hand. The averments as to the former offence go as to 
the punishment only). 
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predicate offense, the double jeopardy analysis becomes complicated. 
This is particularly problematic when the defendant was not convicted 
under the state statute that explicitly parallels the federal definition of the 
predicate offense. In this scenario, double jeopardy becomes a potential 
issue because the prosecution is essentially asserting that being convicted 
for one state offense amounts to the equivalent of being convicted for a 
separate and distinct state offense. More specifically, the double jeopardy 
problem arises when the prosecution wishes to present new evidence 
regarding a prior conviction to prove it meets a different criminal 
definition. This is a problem under double jeopardy because litigating the 
validity of that evidence to attain an increased level of punishment may 
amount to prosecuting the prior offense a second time.161 
For example, in United States v. Hayes, the prosecution sought to 
prove that a prior conviction of simple battery met the federal definition 
of an MCDV.162 Moreover, because West Virginia has a specific 
domestic battery statute that parallels the federal definition, the federal 
government was effectively trying to prove that the defendant’s prior 
conviction amounted to a state conviction for an offense other than that 
to which he pleaded guilty.163 In order to accomplish this, the prosecution 
stated in its indictment that it would present evidence at trial proving that 
the prior conviction of simple battery did in fact meet the federal 
definition of an MCDV.164 This practice would thus be re-litigating the 
circumstances of a prior conviction to achieve an additional degree of 
punishment. Therefore, because it is akin to re-prosecuting the facts of 
the underlying conviction, the practice raises the issue of double 
jeopardy and should invoke the application of the Blockburger “same 
elements” test.165 
Under the Blockburger test and West Virginia law, the crimes of 
domestic battery and simple battery are in fact the “same offense” 
because each violation does not require an additional element that the 
other does not.166 In fact, the only difference between the two statutes is 
  
 161 See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717 (stating that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits 
multiple punishments for the same offense). 
 162 United States v. Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d. 540 (N.D. W. Va. 2005), rev’d on other 
grounds, United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 
U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2008) (No. 07-608). 
 163 Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33) (2006); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-28 (2004). 
 164 Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d at 540–41. 
 165 See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1931) (stating that a single 
act may only be an offense against two statutes if each statute requires proof of an 
additional fact which the other does not). 
 166 Id.; see also W. VA. CODE §§ 61-2-9, 28 (2004). 
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the identity of the victim.167 Moreover, because the federal definition of a 
crime of domestic violence parallels West Virginia’s domestic violence 
statute, proving the elements of the predicate offense in Hayes would 
necessarily involve proving the elements of the state domestic violence 
offense. Therefore, re-litigating the facts of Hayes’ simple battery 
conviction in order to prove that it was in fact an MCDV would require 
the federal government to prove that Hayes had committed the state 
offense of domestic battery. 
The situation in Hayes closely parallels the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Brown v. Ohio.168 In Brown, the defendant had been tried for 
the crime of joyriding, which required the prosecution to establish that 
the defendant took or operated a vehicle without the owner’s consent.169 
Subsequently, the prosecution also sought an auto-theft conviction 
against the same defendant.170 The auto-theft charge required the 
prosecution to prove the same elements as the joyriding offense, but 
required the additional element of intent to permanently deprive the 
owner of possession.171 In its decision, the Court held that: 
as is invariably true of a greater and lesser included offense, the 
lesser offense . . . requires no proof beyond that which is required 
for conviction of the greater . . . [and] [t]he greater offense is 
therefore by definition the “same” for purposes of double 
jeopardy as any lesser offense included in it.172 
Similarly, under the Court’s holding in Brown, the West Virginia 
crime of simple battery is a lesser included offense of domestic battery. 
More particularly, domestic battery is statutorily defined as being simple 
battery with the additional element of the victim’s domestic relationship 
with the defendant.173 Consequently, the Fifth Amendment would clearly 
bar a subsequent prosecution under the domestic violence statute 
following a prior conviction for the same act under the physical violence 
statute. In fact, the West Virginia domestic violence statute appears to 
recognize this by stating that an individual cannot be charged under both 
the domestic violence statute and the physical violence statute for the 
same act.174 
  
 167 See W. VA. CODE §§ 61-2-9, 28 (2004). 
 168 432 U.S. 161 (1977). 
 169 Id. at 167. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. at 168. 
 173 See W. VA. CODE §§ 61-2-9, 28 (2004). 
 174 See W. VA. CODE § 61-2-28(f) (2004). 
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On the other hand, in Hayes, the prosecution did not seek a 
conviction for domestic battery stemming from the simple battery; rather, 
the prosecution sought to show that the simple battery met the federal 
definition of an MCDV.175 Therefore, it is arguable that equating Hayes’ 
simple battery conviction to a crime of domestic violence does not 
constitute a subsequent prosecution or a form of duplicative punishment 
barred by the Fifth Amendment. 
In applying the Shepard analysis at the guilt phase, however, the 
district court in Hayes held that disputed facts outside the judicial record 
of the prior conviction must be submitted to the jury under the Sixth 
Amendment.176 This necessarily amounts to requiring the prosecution to 
re-litigate the facts of the underlying conviction in order to qualify the 
conviction as an MCDV. Thus, the determination of the disputed 
contention regarding the victim of the prior conviction clearly constitutes 
a trial of the disputed evidence.177 Moreover, this case illustrates that a 
state conviction of misdemeanor domestic violence carries a greater 
penalty than simple battery in that it restricts the constitutional right to 
bear arms at the federal level.178 The state’s decision to not allow an 
individual to be prosecuted under both statutes also reflects an 
understanding that doing so would be an impermissible form of 
duplicative punishment.179  
It is also clear that a conviction of domestic battery carries a social 
stigma far different from a conviction for simple battery. Therefore, an 
attempt to prove the existence of an MCDV conviction with evidence 
outside the judicial record of the simple battery conviction would subject 
the defendant to the increased level of punishment associated with a 
separate state conviction through the re-litigation of the underlying facts 
  
 175 United States v. Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d. 540, 541 (N.D. W. Va. 2005), rev’d on 
other grounds, United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 
U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2008) (No. 07-608). 
 176 Id. at 542. 
 177 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1222 (7th ed. 2000) (defining the word “trial” in 
the legal context as: “A formal judicial examination of evidence and determination of 
legal claims in an adversary proceeding.”). 
 178 U.S. CONST. amend. II. Though the precise scope of the constitutional right to bear 
arms has not been clearly delineated by the Supreme Court, the point remains the same—
qualifying the state conviction as an MCDV will subject the defendant to a form of 
punishment above and beyond that which he received for the underlying conviction.  See 
generally Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (2007) (addressing the scope of the 
constitutional right to bear arms). 
 179 See W. VA. CODE §§ 61-2-9, 28 (2004). 
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of the prior conviction.180 Consequently, this re-litigation would force the 
defendant to “run the gauntlet” of defending the battery accusation a 
second time, and should be prohibited as a subsequent prosecution of the 
same offense under state law in violation of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.181 
Therefore, whether the prosecution claims to be re-litigating a prior 
conviction to prove the elements of West Virginia’s domestic battery 
statute or to satisfy the federal definition of a crime of domestic violence, 
the practice will violate Blockburger’s “same elements test.”182 This 
occurs because domestic battery and the federal definition of a crime of 
domestic violence both have elements that simple battery does not, and 
simple battery does not have any elements other than those included in 
both the domestic battery statute and the federal definition.183 Therefore, 
in the context of cases such as Hayes, the use of evidence outside the 
judicial record of the prior conviction will fail the Blockburger “same 
elements” test to run afoul of the Fifth Amendment’s protection against 
double jeopardy. 
Furthermore, this conclusion appears to be equally supported by the 
other double jeopardy tests proposed by legal scholars. Under the 
overturned “same conduct” standard promoted by Professor Susan R. 
Klein, a second prosecution would violate double jeopardy if “the 
government, to establish an essential element of an offense . . . [will] 
prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant ha[s] 
already been prosecuted.”184 In Hayes, any attempt to prove the victim of 
the battery would require the government to reprove the conduct that 
  
 180 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969), overruled on other grounds by 
Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989) (stating that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense). 
 181 Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 (1970) (citing Green v. United States, 355 
U.S. 184, 190 (1957)) (stating that the Double Jeopardy Clause “surely protects a man 
who has been acquitted from having to ‘run the gauntlet’ a second time.”); see also North 
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717–18 (1969) (the Double Jeopardy Clause protects 
against a second prosecution following either acquittal or conviction and “[t]he 
Constitution was designed as much to prevent the criminal from being twice punished for 
the same offence as from being twice tried for it”); Blockburger v. United States, 284 
U.S. 299, 304 (1931) (stating that a single act may only be an offense against two statutes 
if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not). 
 182 See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1931) (stating that a single 
act may only be an offense against two statutes if each statute requires proof of an 
additional fact which the other does not). 
 183 See W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9 (2004); 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33) (2006). 
 184 Susan R. Klein, Review Essay: Double Jeopardy’s Demise, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1001, 
1011 (2000) (reviewing GEORGE C. THOMAS III, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY, THE 
LAW (1998)). 
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constituted the simple battery conviction. Therefore, the “same conduct” 
standard would clearly bar a re-litigation of the underlying facts of 
Hayes’ conviction. 
Under the “same transaction” test advocated by Justice Brennan and 
others, double jeopardy is prevented by not allowing a second 
prosecution for an offense that arose out of the same conduct, episode, or 
transaction of the prior offense.185 In Hayes, the context of Hayes’ prior 
conviction is admittedly one occurrence of violence, and would clearly 
represent only a single transaction.186 Therefore, a re-litigation of the 
circumstances of the simple battery conviction would be prohibited, as it 
would be under the “same conduct” test. 
Under the rigid “same elements” test endorsed by Professor Akhil 
Reed Amar, a court should not look beyond legislative intent and the 
statutory elements of offenses in evaluating double jeopardy concerns.187 
Thus, in Hayes, the double jeopardy issue would still exist because the 
domestic violence statute clearly sets forth legislative intent to not allow 
successive prosecutions for simple battery and domestic battery.188  
Finally, under the “blameworthiness” test advocated by Professor 
George C. Thomas III, double jeopardy would prevent a second 
prosecution if the legislature did not intend that a defendant could be 
prosecuted under both statutes because the act represented a single 
blameworthy act.189 Again, a situation similar to Hayes would present a 
double jeopardy problem because the West Virginia legislature has 
clearly stated that a defendant cannot be prosecuted for both simple 
battery and domestic battery as the result of a single act.190 
Consequently, the Hayes decision provides a clear example of how 
the manner in which a predicate offense is proven has the potential to 
raise serious questions regarding double jeopardy. Any federal statute 
that contains a predicate offense as an element will always require that 
the state conviction meet the federal definition. Moreover, any attempt to 
prove the elements of the federal definition with evidence outside the 
judicial record of the prior conviction will require a re-litigation of 
  
 185 Id. at 1031 (noting Justice Brennan’s support of the “same transaction” test). 
 186 United States v. Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d. 540 (N.D. W. Va. 2005), rev’d on other 
grounds, United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 
U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2008) (No. 07-608). 
 187 Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807, 1833 
(1997). 
 188 W. VA. CODE § 61-2-28(d)–(f) (2004). 
 189 George C. Thomas, A Blameworthy Act Approach to the Double Jeopardy Same 
Offense Problem, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1027 (1995). 
 190 W. VA. CODE § 61-2-28(d)–(f) (2004). 
296 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 4:265 
disputed facts from the prior conviction. Therefore, federal courts must 
apply a double jeopardy analysis to any attempt by the prosecution to use 
evidence outside the judicial record of a prior conviction to prove the 
existence of a predicate offense. 
IV. OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In addition to double jeopardy, proving the existence of a predicate 
offense at the guilt phase of a prosecution may raise other constitutional 
issues as well. Thus, even if a court finds that proving the predicate 
offense at the guilt phase of a prosecution does not violate the Double 
Jeopardy Clause, further analysis should be performed before allowing 
the re-litigation of the prior conviction. More specifically, the 
circumstances of such a practice may raise issues of a defendant’s right 
to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment and state sovereignty under 
the Tenth Amendment.191 These issues are likely to be much more case-
specific, however, because they are not subject to any uniform statutory 
analysis. Therefore, this section only intends to recognize the existence 
of these concerns and how they appeared in the context of United States 
v. Hayes. 
In Barker v. Wingo, the Supreme Court set forth the controlling 
standard of review regarding constitutional challenges regarding the 
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.192 In Barker, the Court held that 
speedy trial questions require a court to use a balancing test on a case-by-
case basis. In balancing the competing interests, a court should consider 
the “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion 
of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant.”193 In Hayes, the eleven-
year span between the simple battery conviction and the potential 
proceeding to revisit the identity of the victim clearly raises concerns 
with regard to the defendant’s right to a speedy trial.194 Most particularly, 
such a lapse of time would clearly seem to inhibit the defendant’s ability 
to establish any potential defense to the subsequent charge. Similarly, 
any case that attempts to prove a predicate offense at the guilt phase of a 
subsequent proceeding will likely generate similar questions surrounding 
the length of delay between the proceedings and the resulting prejudice 
caused to the defendant. 
  
 191 U.S. CONST. amends. VI, X. 
 192 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972). 
 193 Id. at 530. 
 194 United States v. Hayes, 377 F. Supp. 2d. 540 (N.D. W. Va. 2005), rev’d on other 
grounds, United States v. Hayes, 482 F.3d 749 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 76 
U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2008) (No. 07-608). 
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In addition, an attempt by the federal government to prove a 
predicate offense at the guilt phase of a prosecution also raises Tenth 
Amendment issues regarding state sovereignty. In interpreting the Tenth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court has stated that “federal legislation 
threatening to trench on the States’ arrangements for conducting their 
own governments should be treated with great skepticism, and read in a 
way that preserves a State’s chosen disposition of its own power. . . .”195 
Consequently, any Tenth Amendment analysis in regard to proving the 
existence of a predicate offense will necessarily be case-specific. 
However, in any case where the federal government is attempting to re-
litigate the circumstances of a state conviction, there is a risk that the 
state’s interests may be impeded. For example, if the prior conviction 
was the result of a plea agreement, the federal government’s attempt to 
equate that offense to another would seem to circumvent a state’s 
deliberate exercise of its police powers. Therefore, in cases such as 
Hayes, the court should closely examine the circumstances of the prior 
conviction to ensure that the re-litigation of the underlying facts of that 
conviction will not violate the Tenth Amendment. 
It is clear that the manner for proving the existence of a predicate 
offense has the potential to raise questions under both the Sixth 
Amendment and the Tenth Amendment. Consequently, if a court 
concludes that proving a predicate offense with evidence outside the 
judicial record of a prior conviction does not violate the Fifth 
Amendment’s protection against double jeopardy, it must also perform a 
careful analysis of the facts to determine if the Sixth Amendment or 
Tenth Amendment should prohibit the practice. 
V. CONCLUSION 
At this time, it is unclear how the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Hayes will affect the foregoing analysis. If the Court agrees with those 
circuits holding that a prior conviction need not have a domestic 
relationship element in order to qualify as an MCDV, the double 
jeopardy issue in Hayes will resurface. If the Court affirms the decision 
of the Fourth Circuit, the issue of double jeopardy will be removed from 
the context of 18 U.S.C. § 922. However, the issue of double jeopardy 
will remain in any context where a court allows the prosecution to prove 
the existence of a predicate offense with evidence outside the judicial 
record of the prior conviction. Therefore, to protect a defendant’s rights 
under the Fifth Amendment, if a court cannot constitutionally take 
  
 195 Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 140 (2004). 
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judicial notice of a predicate offense, it must invoke a double jeopardy 
analysis before allowing the prosecution to relitigate the circumstances 
of the prior conviction.  
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APPENDIX 
W. VA. CODE § 61-2-28 (2004): 
Domestic violence—Criminal acts: (a) Domestic battery.—Any 
person who unlawfully and intentionally makes physical contact of an 
insulting or provoking nature with his or her family or household 
member or unlawfully and intentionally causes physical harm to his or 
her family or household member, is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon 
conviction thereof, shall be confined in a county or regional jail for not 
more than twelve months, or fined not more than five hundred dollars, or 
both. (b) Domestic assault.—Any person who unlawfully attempts to 
commit a violent injury against his or her family or household member or 
unlawfully commits an act which places his or her family or household 
member in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent 
injury, is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be 
confined in a county or regional jail for not more than six months, or 
fined not more than one hundred dollars, or both. (c) Second offense.—
Domestic Assault or Domestic Battery. A person convicted of a violation 
of subsection (a) of this section after having been previously convicted of 
a violation of subsection (a) or (b) of this section, after having been 
convicted of a violation of subsection (b) or (c), section nine of this 
article where the victim was his or her current or former spouse, current 
or former sexual or intimate partner, person with whom the defendant 
has a child in common, person with whom the defendant cohabits or has 
cohabited, a parent or guardian, the defendant’s child or ward or a 
member of the defendant’s household at the time of the offense or who 
has previously been granted a period of pretrial diversion pursuant to 
section twenty-two, article eleven of this chapter for a violation of 
subsection (a) or (b) of this section, or a violation of subsection (b) or (c), 
section nine of this article where the victim was a current or former 
spouse, current or former sexual or intimate partner, person with whom 
the defendant has a child in common, person with whom the defendant 
cohabits or has cohabited, a parent or guardian, the defendant’s child or 
ward or a member of the defendant’s household at the time of the offense 
is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be 
confined in a county or regional jail for not less than sixty days nor more 
than one year, or fined not more than one thousand dollars, or both. A 
person convicted of a violation of subsection (b) of this section after 
having been previously convicted of a violation of subsection (a) or (b) 
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of this section, after having been convicted of a violation of subsection 
(b) or (c), section nine of this article where the victim was a current or 
former spouse, current or former sexual or intimate partner, person with 
whom the defendant has a child in common, person with whom the 
defendant cohabits or has cohabited, a parent or guardian, the 
defendant’s child or ward or a member of the defendant’s household at 
the time of the offense or having previously been granted a period of 
pretrial diversion pursuant to section twenty-two, article eleven of this 
chapter for a violation of subsection (a) or (b) of this section or 
subsection (b) or (c), section nine of this article where the victim was a 
current or former spouse, current or former sexual or intimate partner, 
person with whom the defendant has a child in common, person with 
whom the defendant cohabits or has cohabited, a parent or guardian, the 
defendant’s child or ward or a member of the defendant’s household at 
the time of the offense shall be confined in a county or regional jail for 
not less than thirty days nor more than six months, or fined not more than 
five hundred dollars, or both. (d) Any person who has been convicted of 
a third or subsequent violation of the provisions of subsection (a) or (b) 
of this section, a third or subsequent violation of the provisions of section 
nine of this article where the victim was a current or former spouse, 
current or former sexual or intimate partner, person with whom the 
defendant has a child in common, person with whom the defendant 
cohabits or has cohabited, a parent or guardian, the defendant’s child or 
ward or a member of the defendant’s household at the time of the offense 
or who has previously been granted a period of pretrial diversion 
pursuant to section twenty-two, article eleven of this chapter for a 
violation of subsection (a) or (b) of this section or a violation of the 
provisions of section nine of this article in which the victim was a current 
or former spouse, current or former sexual or intimate partner, person 
with whom the defendant has a child in common, person with whom the 
defendant cohabits or has cohabited, a parent or guardian, the 
defendant’s child or ward or a member of the defendant’s household at 
the time of the offense, or any combination of convictions or diversions 
for these offenses, is guilty of a felony if the offense occurs within ten 
years of a prior conviction of any of these offenses and, upon conviction 
thereof, shall be confined in a state correctional facility not less than one 
nor more than five years or fined not more than two thousand five 
hundred dollars, or both. (e) As used in this section, “family or 
household member” means “family or household member” as defined in      
48-27-204 of this code. (f) A person charged with a violation of this 
section may not also be charged with a violation of subsection (b) or (c), 
section nine of this article for the same act. (g) No law-enforcement 
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officer may be subject to any civil or criminal action for false arrest or 
unlawful detention for effecting an arrest pursuant to this section or 
pursuant to 48-27-1002 of this code. 
W. VA. CODE § 61-2-9 (2004): 
Malicious or unlawful assault; assault; battery; penalties: (a) If any 
person maliciously shoot, stab, cut or wound any person, or by any 
means cause him bodily injury with intent to maim, disfigure, disable or 
kill, he shall, except where it is otherwise provided, be guilty of a felony 
and, upon conviction, shall be punished by confinement in the 
penitentiary not less than two nor more than ten years. If such act be 
done unlawfully, but not maliciously, with the intent aforesaid, the 
offender shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, shall, in the 
discretion of the court, either be confined in the penitentiary not less than 
one nor more than five years, or be confined in jail not exceeding twelve 
months and fined not exceeding five hundred dollars. (b) Assault.—If 
any person unlawfully attempts to commit a violent injury to the person 
of another or unlawfully commits an act which places another in 
reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury, he 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be confined 
in jail for not more than six months, or fined not more than one hundred 
dollars, or both such fine and imprisonment. (c) Battery.—If any person 
unlawfully and intentionally makes physical contact of an insulting or 
provoking nature with the person of another or unlawfully and 
intentionally causes physical harm to another person, he shall be guilty of 
a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be confined in jail for not 
more than twelve months, or fined not more than five hundred dollars, or 
both such fine and imprisonment. (d) Any person convicted of a violation 
of subsection (b) or (c) of this section who has, in the ten years prior to 
said conviction, been convicted of a violation of either subsection (b) or 
(c) of this section where the victim was a current or former spouse, 
current or former sexual or intimate partner, a person with whom the 
defendant has a child in common, a person with whom the defendant 
cohabits or has cohabited, a parent or guardian, the defendant’s child or 
ward or a member of the defendant’s household at the time of the offense 
or convicted of a violation of section twenty-eight of this article or has 
served a period of pretrial diversion for an alleged violation of subsection 
(b) or (c) of this section or section twenty-eight of this article when the 
victim has such present or past relationship shall upon conviction be 
subject to the penalties set forth in section twenty-eight of this article for 
a second, third or subsequent criminal act of domestic violence offense, 
as appropriate. 
